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In many environments, expertise is costly. 
Costs can manifest themselves in numerous 
ways, ranging from the time that is required 
for a financial consultant to study companies’ 
performances, to the resources necessary for 
academic referees to produce knowledgeable 
reports, to the attention and thought needed for 
jurors to construct informed convictions. The 
current paper asks a natural question germane to 
such contexts: how should a committee of poten-
tial experts be designed, in terms of the number 
of participants, their a priori preferences, as well 
as the rules by which their recommendations are 
aggregated into a collective policy?
We consider a model in which a principal 
makes a binary decision (e.g., continue or abort a 
project), the value of which depends on the real-
ization of some underlying state that is unknown 
(say, whether the project is great or inferior). The 
principal can hire a committee of experts from 
a pool varying in their preferences. All experts 
have access to an information technology provid-
ing (public) information regarding the underlying 
state. Information comes at a private cost to the 
experts, who care both about the final decision 
the principal takes, and about the amount they 
had personally spent on information acquisition.
Concentrating on small committees com-
prised of up to two potential experts, we provide 
several layers of responses to our fundamental 
design question, varying in the flexibility of the 
available contracts. First, we study institutions 
in which agents make their decisions regard-
ing information acquisition simultaneously and 
characterize the optimal way to organize com-
mittees consisting of either one or two agents.
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Next, we consider the full array of sequen-
tial mechanisms. We characterize the optimal 
sequential mechanism and identify the type of 
contract, as well as the preferences of experts 
that are optimal across all classes of institutions 
(simultaneous or sequential). Namely, for a large 
class of cost functions, principals are divided 
into two types. For sufficiently moderate princi-
pals, a sequential mechanism with two identical 
experts who have opposing prior inclinations to 
the principal, and are more extreme, is optimal. 
For all other principals, none of the mechanisms 
is incentive compatible, and such principals are 
best off using no experts and following their ex-
ante inclination.
Underlying the solution to our design problem 
(and any of its forms) are two trade-offs. First, 
for any expert preferences, there is a trade-
off between the need to induce participants to 
acquire expertise on the one hand, and the desire 
to fully utilize this expertise on the other hand. 
Second, when choosing experts’ preferences, 
there is a trade-off between choosing agents with 
similar preferences to the principal’s in order 
to make revealing accurate information more 
valuable to the experts. Yet, choosing experts 
with more extreme preferences makes mistakes 
more costly for them and therefore induces more 
information acquisition as well.
In resolving the first trade-off, the optimal 
mechanism entails the use of at most two agents 
in a sequential mechanism, one in which two 
signals are collected only some of the time. In 
resolving the second trade-off, the optimal mech-
anism consists of agents who have opposing and 
more extreme preferences than the principal.
The analysis is useful in its applicability to 
institutional design in a wide range of environ-
ments, practically any in which information 
(that is later to be aggregated) is not fully exog-
enous. It is also important in eliciting the crucial 
differences between the optimal organizational 
designs that arise under these different plausible 
institutional structures.
The paper contributes to the recently growing 
literature on collective choice with endogenous 
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information, including work by Randall L. 
Calvert (1985), Hao Li (2001), Hongbin Cai 
(2003), Nicola Persico (2004), Robert Dur and 
Otto H. Swank (2005), Rann Smorodinsky and 
Moshe Tennenholtz (2006), Gerardi and  Yariv 
(2007a, b, 2008), Yeon-Koo Che and Navin 
Kartik (2007), and Alex Gershkov and Balázs 
Szentes (forthcoming). Our innovation is in the 
provision of a simple model allowing for the 
characterization of the optimal general mecha-
nism entailing the committee’s size and prefer-
ence composition, as well as the rule by which 
the principal aggregates information (static or 
dynamic).
I.  The Model
There is a principal and a large population 
of experts who apply for two positions. All 
experts have the same ability but different pref-
erences. The goal of the principal is to select 
the optimal mechanism and the optimal pair of 
experts. Our setup is reminiscent of the standard 
jury model (see, e.g., David Austen-Smith and 
Jeffrey S. Banks 1996 or Timothy J. Feddersen 
and Wolfgang Pesendorfer 1998).
We focus on the case in which the two states, 
I and G (a metaphor for a project that is either 
inferior or great), are equally likely: r ; Pr 1G2 
5 1/2.
Information is costly. An expert j can acquire 
a signal of quality pj [ 31/2, 14 . The signal is 
binary, sj 5 i, g. The probability distribution of 
a signal sj of quality pj is Pr 1sj 5 i Z I2 5 Pr 1sj 5 
g Z G2 5 pj . If more than one expert purchases 
information, we assume their signals are condi-
tionally independent.
Let j 5 1, 2 and fix a signal of quality pj . 
Suppose that the realization of the signal is 
sj 5 i, g. We let Pr 1v Z sj ; pj 2 denote the prob-
ability that the state is v 5 I, G given pj and sj . 
Then, Pr 1I Z i; pj 2 5 Pr 1G Z g; pj 2 5 pj . We also let 
Pr 1v Z s1, s2; p1, p22 denote the probability that the 
state is v 5 I, G given p1,  p2,  s1 and s2 . 
The cost of acquiring a signal of quality p is 
c 1p 2 . The cost function c : 31/2, 14 S R1 satisfies 
the following properties:
• c9 11/212 5 0 (c9 11/212 is the right derivative of c 
at p 5 1/2);
• c9 1122 $ 1 (c9 1122 is the left derivative of c at 
p 5 1);
• c0 1p 2 . 0 and c- 1p 2 $ 0 for every p [ 31/2, 14 
(i.e., the marginal cost c9 is increasing and 
convex).
We introduce an additional condition on c. 
CONDITION 1: There exist two numbers, a and 
b in 30, 142,  such that c9 1 1a 1 b 2/22 . 1/2 and
(1)  c9 1a 2 5 b, c9 1b 2 5 a2 .
Notice that under our assumptions on the 
function c,  the system (1) always admits a 
unique solution 1a, b 2 [ 30, 142. Thus, condition 
(1) imposes a restriction on the value of the cost 
function c at the midpoint of the solutions to the 
system (1).
Condition (1) is satisfied if the marginal cost 
c9 has “enough curvature.” For example, sup-
pose that	 c9 1	p 2 5 p 2 1/2k 11 2 p 2  ,
where k . 0. Then condition (1) is satisfied for k 
sufficiently large.
The signals are public but the effort of the 
experts is not observable.
There are two decisions the principal can 
take: A or C (a metaphor for aborting or con-
tinuing the project). The principal’s threshold of 
reasonable doubt is q P, and for each q [ 30, 14 
there are at least two experts with threshold q 
(i.e., the principal can hire any pair of experts). 
We normalize the utility of the optimal deci-
sion to zero and set u 1A, G; q 2 5 2 11 2 q 2 and 
u 1C, I; q 2 5 2q.
The case q p 5 r 5 1/2 is special in the sense 
that adding a signal of quality p to an existing 
signal of the same quality p does not increase 
the principal’s expected payoff. Thus we assume 
that q P Z r. In particular, we focus on the case 
q P . r 5 1/2 (the principal cares more about 
the mistake of continuing an inferior project). 
Clearly, the optimal uninformed decision is A. 
We assume that the principal does not have 
the ability to commit. In particular, given the 
available information, the principal chooses 
the action that maximizes her expected payoff. 
Because of this, we can restrict attention to the 
following mechanisms.
Mechanism  with  One  Expert: The princi-
pal hires one expert. The principal follows the 
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expert’s signal. That is, the principal chooses A 
when the signal is i and C when the signal is g. 
Simultaneous Mechanism: The two experts 
acquire their signals simultaneously (i.e., an 
expert does not observe the realization of the 
signal of the other expert).
Sequential Mechanisms: The relevant sequen-
tial mechanisms to consider are the following:
• Class SiA—If the signal of the first expert is 
i, the principal chooses A without consulting 
the second expert. If the first signal is g, the 
principal continues and follows the advice of 
expert 2. 
• Class SgC—If the signal of the first expert is 
g, the principal chooses C without consulting 
the second expert. If the first signal is i, the 
principal continues and follows the advice of 
expert 2. 
• Class SgA—If the signal of the first expert is 
g, the principal chooses A without consulting 
the second expert. If the first signal is i, the 
principal continues and follows the advice of 
expert 2. 
• Class S2—The principal always asks the sec-
ond expert to invest and follows his signal. 
Of course, the mechanism has to be incentive 
compatible. That is, given the available infor-
mation (and the equilibrium strategies of the 
experts), it is optimal for the principal to follow 
the action prescribed by the mechanism.1 Our 
goal is to find the optimal mechanism and the 
optimal pair of experts. We evaluate the mech-
anism from the point of view of the principal. 
In particular, we do not take into account the 
experts’ cost of acquiring information.
In principal, we should also consider mecha-
nisms in which the principal randomizes at the 
action stage. These mechanisms are incentive 
compatible only if the principal is indifferent 
(i.e., her belief that the state is G is equal to q P ). 
1 For the sake of brevity, we do not consider mechanisms 
that would violate incentive compatibility directly. For 
example, consider the following mechanism. If the signal of 
the first expert is i, the principal chooses C without consult-
ing the second expert. If the first signal is g, the principal 
continues and follows the advice of expert 2. The mecha-
nism is not incentive compatible because it is not optimal 
for the principal to choose C after observing the signal i 
(recall that q P . r ).
It is tedious but simple to show that random 
mechanisms are not optimal. Intuitively, adding 
randomness to a mechanism decreases the prob-
ability that the experts’ signals are pivotal. This, 
in turn, lowers the incentives of the experts to 
acquire information.2
Under our assumptions, we are able to char-
acterize the optimal mechanism.
PROPOSITION (Optimal Generalized Mecha-
nisms): Whenever the cost function c satisfies 
Condition 1,  there exists a threshold level q¯P [ 11/2, 12 such that:	1i 2 If qP # q¯P, then mechanism of class SiA with 
experts q1 5 q2 5 0 is optimal;	1ii 2 If qP . q¯P, then no mechanism is incentive 
compatible. The principal will make the 
optimal uninformed decision A. 
We provide the proof of the Proposition in 
the remaining sections, illustrating the optimal 
mechanism within each class on the way.3
II.  One Expert
Consider a mechanism with one expert who 
has a threshold equal to q. If the principal has 
very extreme preferences, no individual expert 
can sway her prior inclinations, and she is best 
off choosing A regardless of the expert’s reports. 
In any other case, any expert would be useful, as 
the following claim illustrates.
CLAIM 1 (Optimal Mechanism with One Expert): 
If qP # 1c922111/22 ,  then any expert is optimal 
and the accuracy acquired is 1c922111/22 . If qP . 1c922111/22 ,  then it is optimal for the principal to 
2 In principle, there is another form of randomness. A 
principal could choose a mechanism in which she randomly 
decides whether to consult a second expert. However, such 
mechanisms are not credible. Recall that the principal has 
no commitment power. If the second expert acquires infor-
mation, the principal has a strict incentive to hire him. Note 
that in the mechanisms of class SiA, SgC, and SgA, the princi-
pal does not have an incentive to consult the second expert 
when she is not supposed to. Indeed, it is enough to assume 
the following Nash equilibrium off-path behavior: the sec-
ond expert does not acquire information and the principal 
does not react to any information collected.
3 A detailed proof appears in a working paper version, 
Gerardi and Yariv (2007b).
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hire no expert and choose the action A 1or hire 
an expert and disregard his advice,  which in 
equilibrium will be uninformative 2 .
PROOF OF CLAIM 1:
Suppose that the principal follows the 
expert’s signal. The expert’s expected payoff if 
he chooses a signal of quality p is equal to	2r 11 2 q 2 11 2 p 2 2 11 2 r 2q 11 2 p 2 2 c 1	p 2 
   5 2
1
2  11 2 p 2 2 c 1	p 2 .
Notice that the expert’s payoff does not depend 
on his threshold (since r 5 1/2). Of course, the 
expert will choose the level of effort p0 such that 
c9 1p02 5 1/2. The mechanism is incentive com-
patible if and only if p0 5 Pr 1G Z g, p02 $ qP,  and 
the result follows.
Note that, in much the same way, it is easy 
to see that if r . 1/2 1r , 1/22 then it is optimal to 
hire an expert with q 5 0 (q 5 1).
III.  Simultaneous Mechanisms
When two agents are employed, to induce 
both to acquire information is again contingent 
on the principal not being too extreme in her ini-
tial inclinations. In that case, their ideal prefer-
ences are more extreme than the principal’s, as 
the following claim illustrates.
CLAIM 2 (Optimal Simultaneous Mechanism): 
There is an incentive-compatible mechanism 
with two agents acquiring information if and 
only if qP # Pr 1G Z g, g; p˜, p˜2 ,  where 1/2 p˜ 5 c9 1 p˜2 . 
In that case,  the optimal committee consists 
of two experts with q 5 0,  who acquire signal 
accuracy p˜.
PROOF OF CLAIM 2:
Without loss of generality we assume that, 
in equilibrium, expert 1 exerts more effort than 
expert 2, i.e., p1 $ p2 . 1/2 (referred to as the 
(EQ) condition). The principal must choose A 
after 1i, i 2 and 1i, g 2 . Also, she must choose C 
after 1g, g 2 . Otherwise, she would always choose 
A and the experts would not invest. Finally, the 
principal must choose A after 1g, i 2 . If not, then 
she would simply follow the advice of expert 1, 
and p2 . 1/2 would not be optimal for expert 2. 
So we look for equilibria in which p1 $ p2 . 
1/2 and the principal chooses C if and only if the 
signal profile is 1g, g 2 . 
If p1, p2 are equilibrium efforts, they have to 
satisfy
 p1 5 arg  maxp19 2 
1
2 11 2 q12 31 2 p19p24 
 2 
1
2 q1 3 11 2 p19 2 11 2 p22 4 2 c 1	p19 2
and
 p2 5 arg  maxp29 2 
1
2 11 2 q22 31 2 p1 p29 4 
 2 
1
2 q2 3 11 2 p12 11 2 p29 2 4 2 c 1	p29 2 .
Combining the corresponding FOCs with the 
principal’s IC constraints Pr 1G Z g, i; p1, p22 # qP 
and Pr 1G Z g, g; p1, p22 $ qP,  we get the principal’s 
problem:
 max
q1, q2, p1, p2
 2 
1
2 11 2 qP 2 31 2 p1 p24 
 2 
1
2
 qP 3 11 2 p12 11 2 p22 4 ,
subject to the following constraints:1FOC2 12 11 2 q12p2 1 12 q111 2 p22 5 c9 1	p12
 and
 
1
2 11 2 q22p1 1 12 q2 11 2 p12 5 c9 1	p22 ;1IC2  p1 11 2 p2 2p1 11 2 p2 2 1 11 2 p1 2p2 # qP
 and
 
p1p2
p1p2 1 11 2 p1 2 11 2 p2 2  $ qP;1EQ2  p1 $ p2 . 1/2.
Let j 5 1, 2 and k 5 3 2 j denote the pair of 
experts. We define the function Fj 1qj, pk 2 as 
follows:	Fj 1qj, pk 2 5 1c9221a12 11 2 qj 2pk 1 12 qj 11 2 pk 2b
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and notice that 	 'Fj 1qj, pk 2
'qj
 5 
1
2 2 pk
cs 1Fj 1qj, pk 2 2  , 0
 and
 
'Fj 1qj, pk 2
'pk
 5 
1
2 2 qj
cs 1Fj 1qj, pk 2 2 .
Suppose that both experts have q 5 0. The func-
tion Fj 10, pk 2 is increasing, c9 1Fj 10, 1/22 2 5 r/2 
5 1/4, and c9 1Fj 10, 12 2 5 r 5 1/2. This implies 
that the functions F110, · 2 and F2 10, · 2 intersect 
(once because Fj 10, · 2 is concave). Moreover, if 1p1, p22 Z 1F110, p22 , F2 10, p12 2 is such that p1 # 
F110, p22 and p2 # F2 10, p12 ,  then there exists a 
pair 1p19, p29 2 such that for every j 5 1, 2,  pj9 . pj 
and pj9 5 Fj 10, pk92 . 
Consider a pair 1q1, q22 Z 10, 02 and the cor-
responding equilibrium efforts 1	p1, p22 with pj 5 1Fj 1qj, pk 2 2 . Notice that Fj 1qj, pk 2 , Fj 10, pk 2 if qj 
. 0 since Fj is decreasing in qj . But then 1	p1, p22 
Z 1F110, p22 , F2 10, p12 2 and p1 # F110, p22 , p2 # 
F2 10, p12 . We conclude that there exists 1	p19, p29 2 
5 1F110, p29 2 , F2 10, p192 2 with pj9 . pj for every j. 
The principal’s utility is increasing in p1 and p2 
and, thus, the pair of experts 10, 02 is optimal.
Consider now the FOCs for two experts 
with q 5 0 : 1/2 p2 5 c9 1	p12 and 1/2 p1 5 c9 1	p22 , 
which implies 1/2 p2 1 c9 1	p22 5 1/2 p1 1 c9 1	p12 . 
Obviously, the solution must be symmetric: p1 
5 p2 5 p˜ satisfying 1/2 p˜ 5 c9 1	p˜2 . Since the effort 
is symmetric, Pr 1G Z g, i; p˜, p˜2 5 1/2 , qP and the 
claim follows.
In the next section, we show that if there exists 
an incentive-compatible simultaneous mecha-
nism, then there is also an incentive-compatible 
sequential mechanism of class SiA which yields 
the principal a higher utility.
IV.  Sequential Mechanisms
We start with a heuristic comparison between 
the different sequential mechanisms. First, it 
is easy to check that in a mechanism of class 
SgA, expert 1 does not acquire information. This 
is intuitive, since the principal will either go 
against expert 1’s signal, or ignore his advice 
altogether.
Furthermore, note that from the structure 
of the problem, SiA can be implemented with 
experts of preferences 1q1, q22 investing in infor-
mation of accuracies 1p1, p22 if and only if SgC 
can be implemented with the same accuracies 1p1, p22 when choosing experts with preferences 11 2 q1, 1 2 q22 . Given that the principal is 
inclined toward a choice of A, upon choosing a 
sequential mechanism, it is sensible for her to 
pursue more information when preliminary evi-
dence goes against her prior inclinations. That 
is, SiA generates greater expected payoffs than 
SgC .
Comparing the mechanisms S2 and SiA requires 
more subtle arguments. Indeed, when S2 is 
implemented, the second expert in line con-
ditions his level of investment on the signal 
reported by the first expert (otherwise, the first 
expert does not invest in information and we 
are back to the single expert case). Suppose that 
the second expert invests differential amounts 
depending on the first expert’s signal realiza-
tion. The accuracy acquired by the second agent 
is a random variable, with a distribution deter-
mined by the investment of the first expert. For 
sufficiently convex cost functions, the average 
accuracy is far lower than in SiA,  and generates 
a lower expected payoff. In fact, Condition 1 
assures that this is indeed the case.
The arguments above can be formalized in a 
straightforward manner, and their details appear 
in Gerardi and Yariv (2007b). In what follows, 
we characterize the optimal committee when 
SiA is implemented, and illustrate its superiority 
over the single agent as well as the simultane-
ous mechanism, thereby providing a proof for 
the proposition.
Consider, then, the sequential mechanism SiA 
and let p1 and p2 denote the effort of the two 
experts. If expert 1 observes signal g,  then 
expert 2 assigns probability p1 5 Pr 1G Z g; p12 to 
state G. 
The principal’s utility is equal to	2 12 11 2 qP2 11 2 p1 p22 2 12 qP 11 2 p12 11 2 p22
and is increasing in p1 and p2.
The utility of expert 1 is equal to 21/2 11 2 q12	
3	 11 2 p1 p22 2 1/2 q111 2 p12 11 2 p22 2 c 1	p12 
with FOC 1/2 11 2 q12p2 1 1/2 q111 2 p22 2 c9 1	p12 
5 0.
Recall that the function F11q1, p22 is defined 
as follows: 	F11q1, p22 5 1c9221a12 11 2 q12p2 1 12 q111 2 p22b .
MAY 2008192 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
The utility of expert 2 is equal to 2 3p111 2 q22 
1 11 2 p12q24 11 2 p22 2 c 1	p22 with FOC p111 2 q22 
1 11 2 p12q2 2 c9 1	p22 5 0.
Let the function G2 1q2, p12 be defined by	 G2 1q2, p12 5 1c92211	p111 2 q22 1 11 2 p12q22
and notice that	 'G2 1q2, p1 2
'q2
 5 
1 2 2p1
cs 1G2 1q2, p1 2 2  , 0 
and 
'G2 1q2, p1 2
'p1
 5 
11 2 2q2 2
cs 1G2 1q2, p1 2 2 .
Consider the function G2 10, p12 5 1c92211	p12 . 
It is increasing, c9 1G2 10, 1/22 2 5 r 5 1/2, and 
c9 1G2 10, 12 2 5 1. 
This, together with the properties of F110, p22 
(see proof of Claim 2), imply the following. The 
functions F110, · 2 and G2 10, · 2 intersect once. 
Moreover, if 1p1, p22 Z 1F110, p22 , G2 10, p12 2 is 
such that p1 # F110, p22 and p2 # G2 10, p12 ,  then 
there exists a pair 1	p19, p29 2 5 1F110, p29 2 , G2 10, p192 2 
with pj9 . pj for every j 5 1, 2.
We now show that the optimal pair of experts 
in a mechanism of class 1 is q1 5 q2 5 0. 
Consider the pair 1q1, q22 Z 10, 02 with effort 
levels 1	p1, p22 . Notice that	 p1 5 F11q1, p22 # F110, p22
and p2 5 G2 1q2, p12 # G2 10, p12
and at least one inequality is strict. Thus, there 
exist effort levels 1	p19, p29 2 for the pair of experts 10, 02 with pj9 . pj ,  for every j.
Let 1	pˆ1, pˆ22 be the effort levels of the optimal 
pair of experts. They are defined by:
(2)  
1
2   pˆ2 5 c9 1	pˆ12 and pˆ1 5 c9 1	pˆ22 .
Notice that under our assumptions (c convex, 
c9 11/22 5 0, c9 112 $ 1), the system of equations 
(2) always admits a unique solution 1/2 , pˆ1 , 
pˆ2 , 1.
Of course, we need to check that Pr 1G Z g, g; pˆ1, pˆ22 
. qP; otherwise the principal will not choose 
C after receiving reports 1g, g 2 (it is straight-
forward to see that all the other constraints are 
satisfied).
Comparison between Simultaneous Mecha-
nisms and SiA Mechanisms.—Suppose that there 
exists an incentive-compatible simultaneous 
mechanism (with q1 5 q2 5 0 ) with symmetric 
effort level p˜ defined in Claim 2. Then it is easy 
to see that there is also an incentive compatible 
sequential mechanism of type SiA (with q1 5 q2 
5 0) with effort levels pˆ1 . p˜ and pˆ2 . p˜. Recall, 
also, that in the optimal simultaneous mecha-
nism the principal chooses C if and only if both 
experts observe g. We conclude that the opti-
mal mechanism of type SiA dominates the best 
simultaneous mechanism with two experts.4
Comparison between One Expert Mecha-
nisms and SiA Mechanisms.—Suppose that 
there exists an incentive-compatible mechanism 
with one expert with effort level p0 (defined in 
Claim 1). Then there also exists an incentive-
compatible mechanism of type SiA (with q1 5 q2 
5 0) with effort levels pˆ1 and pˆ2. It follows from 
the definition of p0 and the FOC’s correspond-
ing to SiA that pˆ2 . p0 . pˆ1.
Let U 1	pˆ1, pˆ22 denote the principal’s expected 
payoff under the mechanism of class SiA. Simi-
larly, let U 1p02 denote the principal’s payoff 
under the mechanism with one expert. We have
(3)  U 1	pˆ1, pˆ22 5 212  11 2 qP2 11 2 pˆ1 pˆ22 
 2 
1
2  q
P 11 2 pˆ12 11 2 pˆ22 ,
 U 1	p02 5 212  11 2 qP 2 11 2 p02 2 12  qP 11 2 p02 .
After algebraic manipulations, the payoff dif-
ference between the two mechanisms is equal to	U 1	pˆ1, pˆ22 2 U 1	p02 5 212   11 2 qP2 1	p0 2 pˆ1 pˆ22 
    1 
1
2  q
P 1	pˆ1 1 pˆ2 2 pˆ1 pˆ2 2 p02 
   . 2
1
2   11 2 qP 2 1	p0 2 pˆ1 pˆ22 
 1 
1
2  11 2 qP 2 1	pˆ1 1 pˆ2 2 pˆ1 pˆ2 2 p02 
 5 
1
2   11 2 qP 2 1pˆ1 1 pˆ2 2 2p02 ,
4 Note that this comparison relies only on the assump-
tion that the cost function c is convex, and does not require 
Condition 1.
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where the inequality follows from the fact that 1	pˆ1 1 pˆ2 2 pˆ1 pˆ2 2 p02 . 0 and qP . 1 2 qP.
Notice that 1	pˆ1, pˆ22 are the solution to the sys-
tem of equations (2). It follows from Condition 1 
and the definition of p0 that 
pˆ1 1 pˆ2	 c9a    b . 12  5 c9 1	p02 . 2
Recall that c9 is strictly increasing. Thus, 1	pˆ1 1 pˆ22/2 . p0 . In particular, U 1	pˆ1, pˆ22 . U 1	p02 
as needed.
V.  Conclusion
We explore the effects of informational costs 
on the optimal design of institutions. We con-
centrate on the design of decision panels that 
are comprised of experts facing a joint task, 
such as a firm’s shareholders, academic refer-
ees, and trial jurors. Unlike most of the extant 
literature, we consider environments in which 
experts have to expend resources in order to get 
private information about the relative merits of 
each available alternative. The principal can 
choose the number of experts, their preferences, 
as well as the procedure by which the collective 
recommendation is selected (that is, the corre-
spondence between experts’ reports and the dis-
tribution over her final choices). Underlying the 
principal’s design problem are two trade-offs. 
First, for any expert preferences, there is a trade-
off between the need to induce participants 
to acquire expertise on the one hand, and the 
desire to fully utilize this expertise on the other 
hand. Second, when choosing experts’ prefer-
ences, there is a trade-off between choosing 
agents with similar preferences to the principal’s 
in order to make revealing accurate informa-
tion more valuable to the experts and choosing 
experts with more extreme preferences to make 
mistakes more costly for them and induce more 
information acquisition to begin with. Looking 
at a general class of mechanisms, we fully char-
acterize the optimal mechanism. We show that it 
entails the use of at most two agents in a sequen-
tial mechanism, one in which two signals are 
collected only some of the time. Furthermore, 
the optimal mechanism consists of agents who 
have opposing and more extreme preferences 
than the principal. Our analysis is applicable to 
numerous environments in which information is 
not fully exogenous.
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